by
Stephen Rapawy
Introduction
Ukraine has been a part of neighboring states for much of its history. Foreign occupations precipitated migration of different nationalities, making Ukraine a multinational country. At the end of the 19th century, industrial growth in eastern Ukraine hastened migration of Russians in search of jobs, and of Ukrainians from villages to towns where they were rapidly assimilated. Essentially, these trends continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Recent data suggest that since independence, the trend has reversed--the share of Ukrainians is increasing slowly and Russians are proportionally decreasing. Two data sets indicate this trend-- published figures on births by nationality of the mother and surveys conducted by western organizations.
The 1989 census reported that 25 percent of all families in Ukraine had spouses of different nationalities. However, during the census enumeration, respondents had to select only one nationality. A recent World Bank survey indicates that nearly one-sixth of the population is of Ukrainian/Russian ancestry, but most chose Russian nationality during the census. In recent years, surveys indicate a growing share of the population identifying itself as Ukrainian while the Russian portion is decreasing. At the same time, a growing percentage of women register their children as Ukrainian. The Russian share is decreasing proportionately.
The political ramifications of these trends are unclear. Many Ukrainians in the east and south do not identify strongly with Ukraine. Others, who until recently considered themselves Russian, would be in this category as well. There are, however, some unidentifiable undercurrents which make Ukrainian nationality preferable. Coupled with an increased use of Ukrainian in education, these trends should produce a population with a stronger attachment to Ukraine.
Historical Background
The 13th century Mongol invasion started a series of events which are still evident in the population of Ukraine. The invasion broke up the loosely-organized Kieven state, bringing some lands under direct Mongol control, while others continued precarious existence as Mongol vassals. One of the most important was the Galician-Volyhnia Principality in western Ukraine. The principality suffered several punishing raids by the Mongols, but retained its independence. By the mid 14th century, two events converged to end the independence. The male line of the local ruling dynasty died out, and Polish principalities were unified by Casimir III the Great.
Taking advantage of the chaos, Casimir, with the help of Hungary, conquered Galicia. Lithuania conquered the northern portion of the principality, Volyhnia. During the next several centuries, the Polish state continuously expanded eastward, especially after the establishment of the Commonwealth with Lithuania.
Polish occupation brought many Poles and Jews to Ukraine. The growth of the Polish population resulted from migration and assimilation. The assimilation was more rapid among the nobility and the urban population, as towns turned into Polish enclaves surrounded by Ukrainian countryside. Jews came from Poland, as in the late Middle Ages, vicious pogroms and expulsion of Jews occurred in various parts of Western Europe. At the same time, the Polish Crown encouraged migration to expand commerce and industry. The two events brought many Jews to Poland, and as the Polish state expanded eastward, Jewish migrants followed.
Russia absorbed most Ukrainian lands during the partitions of Poland, precipitating more migration and assimilation. Assimilation under Russian rule was much more rapid than under Poland. Religion seems to have been a major factor in the process. Both Russians and Ukrainians are Orthodox, and assimilation did not entail conversion into another faith, as was the case with the Roman Catholic Poles.
Many others, besides Russians, began settling in Ukraine at the end of the 18th century. After centuries of warfare, Russia seized the Black Sea steppes from the Ottomans and subdued the Tatar tribes who had been attacking sedentary populations for centuries. The conquest opened large, fertile territory to farming, and Catherine II encouraged rapid settlement of the area by promoting migration from other parts of the Empire and from abroad. Several Orthodox groups migrated from the Balkans, and many Germans settled in the area, giving it a multiethnic coloration.
Russian migration within the current boundaries of Ukraine had several phases during the Tsarist period. In the northeast, Russians built and manned fortifications, mixing with Ukrainians from the west. In the Black Sea area, military and civilian officials received large tracts of land and the right to resettle serfs from Russia. The settlers were augmented by army veterans who, after their service, often chose to remain in the area. Members of various persecuted sects in Russia also moved to the region. Finally, the development of coal, steel, and related industries created demand for labor, precipitating another wave of migrants from Russia at the end of the 19th century.
Development of industry in the east created jobs, bringing in not only Russians but also Ukrainians from the surrounding Ukrainian-speaking countryside. The new rural migrants quickly claimed Russian as their native language since the Russian language predominated in towns. This phenomenon can be most readily seen in the city of Kharkiv. The 1897 census reported that 63 percent of the inhabitants migrated from the surrounding and predominantly Ukrainian-speaking countryside (language, not nationality was asked in the census) but only 25 percent claimed Ukrainian as their national language. The migration took place largely after the abolition of serfdom in 1861, and the new Ukrainian migrants claimed Russian since Ukrainian was considered a crude peasant dialect. It is highly improbable that illiterate, or at best semiliterate, people from Ukrainian villages in a comparatively short period of time would forget Ukrainian and acquire proficiency in Russian, especially since they worked and socialized with people of similar backgrounds.
Government policies of the time encouraged the rapid abandonment of the Ukrainian language. The Russian government, and indeed the Russian establishment in general, considered Ukrainians (Little Russians in the parlance of the time) a regional variant of Russians, and that the Ukrainian language was a crude peasant dialect. This view was widely accepted by Ukrainians and, to some extent, is still evident in eastern Ukraine today. The government did not rely solely on propaganda and took more direct measures. Some Ukrainian cultural figures were deported and Ukrainian schools and publications were closed. In 1876, Tsar Alexander II expanded these policies by signing a secret decree banning use of Ukrainian in print and public life and prohibiting importation of Ukrainian language literature. These attitudes and policies obscured the fact that cities, in large measure, consisted of Russified Ukrainians or people of Russian-Ukrainian ancestry.
At the turn of the century, Ukraine, within its current boundaries, had a population of just under 30 million. Ukrainians comprised about 72 percent, Jews- 9 percent, Russians- 8 percent, Poles over 4 percent, and the remaining groups almost 7 percent. Wars, revolutions, and famines inflicted heavy but uneven losses on all groups, and some barely survived. Western Ukraine saw World War I fighting, causing grievous, war-related losses. Revolution, famine, and typhus inflicted heavy losses in the east. After the revolution, restrictions confining Jews to the Pale of Settlements, basically eastern boundaries of the Polish state in the 18th century, were lifted and many Jews moved to large eastern cities, while others migrated to Russia, especially Moscow and Petrograd (later Leningrad, and now St. Petersburg). The 1930s famine was confined largely to the villages, and losses fell mostly on Ukrainians who were then predominantly rural.
World War II inflicted huge losses on all, but some groups were singled out for special treatment. Soviet occupation of western Ukraine in 1939, which was under Poland between the wars, precipitated extensive arrests and deportation. All groups were affected, but Poles suffered the most. Former Polish officials and community leaders were arrested, killed, or deported with their families. The Soviet government also signed a population exchange agreement with Germany. Some Germans migrated to Germany under this agreement, and a small number of Ukrainians in the German zone went to Ukraine. At the outbreak of Soviet-German hostilities in 1941, Germans from the Black Sea steppes were deported to the interior, especially Kazakhstan. Many Jews fled before the advancing German army; those who remained were almost completely exterminated. Reconquest of Ukraine brought another wave of deportations for disloyalty, real and imagined, to the Soviet regime. In the east, Crimean Tatars, Greeks, and Armenians were deported, and insurrection in western Ukraine resulted in massive deportation of Ukrainians after the war. The so-called voluntary exchange of population between Poland and Ukraine began the expulsion of Poles from Ukraine, and a small number of Jews, who had been Polish citizens before the war, chose to go to Poland as well.
The first post-war census, in 1959, showed a far different ethnic composition than had been the case earlier in the century. Ukrainians now comprised 77 percent of the population of almost 42 million. Russians increased to 17 percent, Jews dropped to 2 percent, Poles to 1 percent, and other nationalities to 3 percent. Between 1959 and 1989, Ukraine's population grew annually at 0.6 percent, Ukrainians at 0.5 percent, and Russians at 9.1 percent, due to migration and assimilation. As the Soviet Union started disintegrating, additional changes occurred; Crimean Tatars were permitted to return, and Jews were allowed to emigrate. The two trends have continued since independence. Figures for the two populations will have to await the results of the census scheduled for 1999.
Census nationality data obscure mixed ancestry of a sizeable share of the population of Ukraine by requiring respondents to choose only one nationality. Many centuries of inter-marriages produced a heterogenous population. The 1989 census reported 14,057,000 families, 25 percent of whom had spouses of different nationalities,(1) but for official purposes, children of these marriages had to choose the nationality of only one parent. Urbanization intensified this process as people from villages, usually populated by a single group, were drawn into multiethnic urban centers, increasing the number of mixed marriages. In 1989, for example, 32 percent of urban families were of mixed ancestry, but the rate dropped to 12 percent in rural areas. The Russian share has remained relatively stable, but the Ukrainian rate has been declining. The decline appears to be related to the larger share of Ukrainians living in villages where the population is more homogenous and marriages decreased less than in the cities. Members of smaller nationalities tend to intermarry more because the possibilities to socialize and marry within the group are limited. The 1994 figures show that 18 percent of Ukrainians married outside their group, while the Russian share rose to 59 percent and the Jewish to 75 percent.
The varying percentages among nationalities reflect both the size of the group and the urban/rural factor. Ukrainians are not only the largest nationality in the country, but a large share, 40 percent in 1989, are village dwellers. By contrast, Jews are few in number, living almost exclusively in cities. These factors are readily apparent in the highly- urbanized and ethnically-mixed Donetsk Oblast.(2) Ukrainians comprise just 50 percent of the population, and the share marrying outside their group rises to 41 percent. The percentage for Russians drops to 54 percent, while in a small Jewish group, 79 percent chose non-Jewish spouses.
During the summer of 1995, a representative sample of the population of Ukraine was interviewed on a wide range of socioeconomic issues, including two questions on the national identity of respondents. The first question asked respondents to indicate their nationality. The second question asked to indicate the degree of mixed ancestry. The share of the population claiming Ukrainian nationality was several percentage points below the 73 percent reported in the 1989 census, and the Russian share dropped more than half from the 22 percent reported in the census. At the same time, almost one-sixth of the population considered itself to be of Ukrainian/Russian ancestry. There is, of course, some degree of error in the survey, but the share of mixed population is consistent with the official figures on mixed families and mixed marriages.
Current Ethnic Trends
Registration of births by nationality of the mother is the most explicit indicator of reidentification. Caution must be exercised when interpreting the indicator since trends are unfolding in the context of decreased birth rates and the differences in urban and rural rates. Ukraine, as other parts of the former Soviet Union, has experienced population changes normally associated with a major war. Between 1989 and 1994, marriages fell by 19 percent and births by 25 percent. The drop in both is greater in urban than rural areas. A more refined measure, total fertility rate--number of children born per woman during child bearing years--shows comparable decline. The 1989/90 rate of 1.9 decreased to 1.4 by 1994/95. A total fertility rate of 2.2 generally is needed to maintain population at current levels. These changes generally are attributed to the economic deterioration in the region. However, economic crises are only partially responsible. Birth rates were decreasing even before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing economic decline; births, for example, dropped 5 percent between 1989 and 1990.
In recent years, figures have been
published on births by nationality of the mother.
The trend indicates a growing share of children
born to Ukrainian women and a corresponding
decrease of
children born to Russian women.
The share for other nationalities remains stable
(Figure 1). The 1989 census figures indicate
that Ukrainians comprised 73 percent of the
population and Russians 22 percent. The share
of births in 1989 by Ukrainian women was
higher than the Ukrainian share of the
population because the total fertility rate for
Ukrainian women was higher, 2.0 children per
woman, compared to Russian women, 1.8
children per woman. The difference is due
largely to more Ukrainians than Russians living
in the rural areas, where the birth rates are
higher. Nationality decreases are greater for the
urban population, 26 and 40 percents,
respectively. The lower urban rates reduced the
Russian overall total more than Ukrainian
because 88 percent of Russians lived in cities
compared to 60 percent of Ukrainians in 1989.
Trends for the remaining nationalities are
erratic. The urban/rural differential is greater
than among the two major nationalities, and the
number of rural births increased in the early
1990s. As the Soviet Union was collapsing,
Jews were permitted to emigrate, and the
emigration has continued since independence.
Emigration decreased births by Jews from 2,919
in 1989 to 918 in 1994. At the same time,
Crimean Tatars, deported in 1944, were
permitted back, with 250,000 returning by
1996.
Data for Crimean Tatars are limited, but their impact on births can be detected. The 1989 census reports that of 86,875 Tatars, 87 percent were living in towns, and of the 46,807 Crimean Tatars, 67 percent lived in villages. Births are reported as a combined figure for all Tatar groups, but there is no indication of Tatars, other than Crimean Tatars, migrating to Ukraine. In 1989, 2,674 children were born to Tatar women, and the number of births peaked at 3,922 in 1992. The erratic changes for the smaller nationalities, therefore, have been caused by immigration of rural Crimean Tatars.
Oblasts for which birth data are reported are selected from different regions of the country to represent both urban and rural areas and varying ethnic mixes. The pattern observed earlier is replicated in all the regions, and the decrease is greater in urban than in rural areas (Rapawy, 1997, Table A-1). At the same time, the decline is steeper for Russians than Ukrainians in urban as well as in rural areas.(3) The decline for all the groups was the greatest in Kyiv, the largest city in Ukraine, with 2.6 million population. The city rate is slightly lower than the urban rates for the oblasts, which include towns that are still partially rural. The lowest decline occurred in Vinnytsya, a largely rural oblast in central Ukraine.
There are several possible reasons for the diverging birth rates between the two ethnic groups: age/sex differences, educational attainment, migration, or ethnic reidentification. The Ukrainian population is slightly older than the Russian population, but Russian women of reproductive age (20-45 years) comprise 36 percent of the total compared to 31 percent for Ukrainians.(4) A greater share of women in the reproductive ages should work to the advantage of Russians and cannot explain the decrease in birth rates. Educational attainment differs between the two groups, but narrows when only urban populations are compared.(5) Furthermore, there is no indication of changes in the age distribution or educational attainment in the two groups during the last 6 years that would account for diverging birth rates. Income data by nationality are not available, but there has always been a strong correlation between income and education. Minor differences between Russians and Ukrainians, described above, cannot explain a sudden and substantial divergence in births.
A sudden, large emigration of Russians could have reduced Russian births. Migration data for most years are not reported by nationality, but the overall figures are low and Ukraine had a small positive migration balance until 1994. Population movement mostly was between Russia and Ukraine. In 1993, for example, 207,400 of the 356,600 immigrants came from Russia, and 204,800 of 307,000 emigrants went to Russia.(6) In 1994, 102,737 immigrated and 245,924 emigrated, giving Ukraine a negative migration balance of 143,187. In 1994, 93,374 more Russians left Ukraine than came. The corresponding figure for Ukrainians is 20,102. The two groups account for 79 percent of the negative migration balance during the year.(7) Thus, the relatively small decrease of Russians out of a total of 11.4 million reported in the 1989 census could hardly account for the reported drop in births.
Ethnic reidentification of mothers who changed from Russian to Ukrainian nationality is the most likely explanation. Russian births in Ukraine between 1989 and 1994 fell 14 percent more than all the births in Ukraine. Similarly, Russian births in Ukraine fell 3 percent more than all the births in Russia. Based on these comparisons, we assume that the 14 percent and 3 percent mark the outer limits of reidentification. But the change of maternal nationality, as well as the general population, can be further inferred by comparing census nationality data with the change in births by nationality. Censuses provide the only official statistics on the nationality of the population. Census enumerators record respondents' nationality, and the nationality data appear internally consistent. Nationality data may be obtained from internal passports, but if these statistics were compiled, the data never were released. The passport, however, has had the most direct impact on the census figures.
At age 16, Soviet citizens were required to obtain an internal passport that, in addition to the usual biographic information, indicated the nationality of the holder. If both parents had the same nationality, that became the child's nationality. But if the parents had different nationalities, the child could choose the nationality of either parent, but could not later legally change it. However, through bribes and other machinations, some individuals may have been able to change their nationality later. Based on anecdotal information, falsification was confined mostly to Jews who wanted to hide their origin. Russians, as a dominant group, would have had no reason to claim a different nationality; those who were only partially Russian, as Ukrainian figures indicate, more often than not, declared themselves Russian. People who were completely Ukrainian and lived in Ukraine had little incentive to falsify their nationality, and to whatever extent it may have occurred, it does not appear to have been significant.
The passport nationality would have a powerful influence on the nationality reported during the census: enumerators asked for the passport and used the information to fill out questionnaires. Even if the passport was not requested, there would have been little reason to claim different nationality during the census, since the authorities already knew the respondent's nationality. Nationality was a permanent feature of a person's identity and had to be indicated on various documents, such as an application to an institution of higher learning. The census data during the Soviet era, then, can be accepted as reasonably accurate and may be used as a benchmark against which survey figures or births by nationality are compared.
Since independence, several western agencies and individual scholars have conducted surveys in Ukraine on a range of social, political, and economic issues. The surveys normally include a question on nationality and occasionally a question on language preference. The figures do not show consistent trends evident in the data on births by nationality of mother. Of 8 surveys cited, 6 show a growing share of Ukrainians since 1989, while two report a decline (Rapawy, 1997, p. 15). The surveys usually claim that the marginal error is within several percentage points, therefore, the two surveys showing a decline still fall inside that confidence limit. Survey figures and changes in births by nationality suggest that a perceptible reidentification has been occurring in the last several years.
There is no indication which segment of the population is changing, but individuals of mixed ancestry are very likely candidates. Figures on mixed marriages indicate the potential size of this group, and a World Bank survey provides additional information. Individuals were asked to indicate their nationality, and in the case of Ukrainians and Russians, to specify their ancestry as well. The survey data differ considerably from the census figures, especially for Russians. In the census, an individual could choose a single nationality, but in the survey they were asked to indicate whether they were completely Russian or Ukrainian. The differences in definitions decreased the Russian rate from 22 percent in the census to 11 percent in the survey. The Ukrainian decrease is less dramatic but still significant--from 73 to 67 percent. These percentages imply that most self-declared Ukrainians have both parents of the same nationality, while many Russians have mixed ancestry. Apparently, some of these Russians now claim Ukrainian nationality.
Ethnicity and Politics
Ukrainians and Russians, as groups, have similar opinions on a wide range of socioeconomic problems, but there are major differences between them on many political and foreign policy issues, especially regarding relations with Russia. The differences can be discerned from the votes for independence, election results, and more directly from recent surveys.
The overwhelming vote for independence in the December 1, 1991 referendum surprised most observers. Even in Crimea, 54 percent voted for independence. There were undoubtedly various motives and differing views of what independence actually meant. There is, however, a strong relationship between the share of Ukrainians and the share of votes for independence. Ternopil Oblast, with the highest share of Ukrainians, 97 percent, cast the most votes for independence, 99 percent. In Ivano-Frankivsk, where Ukrainians comprised 95 percent of the population, the second highest after Ternopil, 98 percent voted for independence.(8) Eastern oblasts with fewer Ukrainians also cast fewer votes for independence, although in all cases, the share of votes for independence was much higher than the percentage of Ukrainians. In Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, Ukrainians comprised barely a majority, but both oblasts cast 84 percent of their votes for independence.
The 1994 presidential and parliamentary elections show similar patterns. President Leonid Kravchuk was perceived during the campaign as an advocate of a strong Ukrainian state, while the challenger Leonid Kuchma, by favoring closer ties with Russia and advocating Russian as a second state language, was distrusted by the more patriotic Ukrainians. During the second round of voting, Kuchma garnered 52 percent of the votes compared to 45 percent for Kravchuk, but the differences by region were stark.(9) In the 5 eastern oblasts, Kuchma received 76 percent of the vote, compared to 22 percent for Kravchuk.(10) On the other hand, Kravchuk received 87 percent of the vote in the 7 oblasts that became a part of the Soviet Union after the war, compared to 10 percent for Kuchma. The idea of a strong Ukrainian statehood is obviously much greater among Ukrainians in the west than in the east. Nationalists and national democrats failed to attract much of a following in the east. Communists and leftists, who favored retaining much of the Soviet economic system and maintaining either strong ties with Russia or a restoration of the former Soviet Union in some form, swept the east.
The most direct information on political view by ethnicity comes from surveys. Typically, individuals are asked to indicate their nationality, followed by specific questions on political and economic problems facing the country. Data presented here are derived from a survey sponsored by the United States Information Agency, conducted in the autumn of 1996.(11)
Ukrainians and Russians have similar views on many social and economic issues, but Ukrainians tend to be more optimistic. For example, just 1 percent of both groups thought that the economic situation would improve significantly for their family during the next year; however, 18 percent of Ukrainians thought it would improve a little, compared to 9 percent for Russians. Similarly, 15 percent of Ukrainians had considerable confidence in the new currency, the hryvna, compared to 5 percent among Russians. And 22 percent of Ukrainians thought democracy would be strengthened, compared to 12 percent among Russians.
Nostalgia for the former Soviet Union is stronger among Russians than Ukrainians, and predictably, few Russians identify with Ukraine. In the survey, 51 percent of Russians agreed that "it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists," and another 19 percent agreed more than disagreed. The figures for Ukrainians are 35 percent and 17 percent, respectively. Nostalgia for the Soviet Union appears to be a yearning for a time when at least minimal human needs were met, rather than a strong ideological commitment. The question whether Ukraine and Russia should unite drew a similar response. Twenty four percent of Ukrainians thought the country should reunite with Russia, with an additional 19 percent expressing partial support. Russian percentages were 50 and 33 percents, respectively.
Opinion differs by region, but differences by ethnicity are not available because the data are not tabulated by both region and nationality. Nevertheless, the desire for unification of some sort appears marginal among Ukrainians in the west, but substantial in the east. Ukrainians comprise almost 90 percent of the population in the seven oblasts that joined the Soviet Union after the war.(12) Only 11 percent in these oblasts favored outright unification, with an additional 16 percent being lukewarm to the idea. In the east, where Ukrainians account for 54 percent and Russians for 41 percent, 46 percent of the respondents favored unification and 33 percent favored it advisedly.(13)
Conclusions
The ethnic situation in Ukraine is much more complex than census figures indicate. Normally, both parents of self-declared Ukrainians are Ukrainian, but about a half of self-declared Russians are of Ukrainian-Russian ancestry. In recent years, some portion of that population has identified itself as Ukrainian. The political implication of this trend in the near future is uncertain. There is considerable ambivalence about the Ukrainian state and relations with Russia, even among Ukrainians. The uncertainty becomes especially strong in the east and the south, and these regions have a large share of Russians and Ukrainians of mixed ancestry. The territories were settled under the auspices of the Russian state, although Ukrainians comprised a majority by the end of the 19th century. Historical experience cannot be quantified, but the past influences the present. It is easier to accept Russian rule in the area where Russian domination spans generations than in the southwest, where the Russian influence was recent and brief.
There are undercurrents that motivate people to redefine their identity, even in the more Russified areas. However, individuals who yesterday considered themselves Russian and today Ukrainian can hardly be expected to have a strong commitment to Ukraine. But over time, these trends, coupled with the growing use of the Ukrainian language in education, will produce more people who identify with Ukraine.
1. Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayiny, Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrayiny u 1991 rotsi. Tekhnika, Kyiv, 1992, p. 80.
2. Percentages were calculated from the reported data in Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayiny, Naselennya Ukrayiny, 1994. Kyiv, 1995, pp. 131 and 136.
3. The only exception is a slight increase in rural births for all the groups in Odesa. Data are not available in sufficient detail to determine the cause for the slight increase in the early 1900's. The increase, in any event, was minimal, 289 births in 1991, the peak year, compared to the 1989 level.
4. Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayiny, Natsionalnyy sklad naselennya Ukrayiny, chastyna I. Kyiv, 1991, pp. 33-35.
5. Ibid., pp. 104-105.
6. Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayiny, Narodne Hospodarstvo Ukrayiny u 1993 rotsi. Kyiv, Tekhnika, 1994, p. 263.
7. Ministerstvo statystyky-, Naselennya Ukrayiny, 1994. Kyiv, 1995, pp. 88 and 91-95.
8. Shares of the population by nationality came from the 1989 census; referendum results are reported by Roman Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine," Europe-Asia Studies, no. 1, 1994, p. 48.
9. RFE/RL Research Report, no. 32, August 19, 1994, p. 10.
10. The five oblasts are: Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya.
11. A representative sample of 1,200 people was selected from different parts of Ukraine and each respondent was asked 66 questions, some questions had multiple parts. I thank Steven Grant and Richard Dobson of the USIA for generously giving me the data derived from the survey.
12. The west defined in the survey, consists of Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankinsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Volyn, and Zakarpattya oblasts.
13. East consists of Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Luhansk oblasts.
FBIS-SOV-96-080, 24 April 1996, p. 60.
Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayiny, Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrayiny u 1993, rotsi. Kyiv, Tekhnika, 1994.
_____. Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrayiny u 1991 rotsi. Kyiv, Tekhnika, 1992.
Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayiny, Naselennya Ukrayiny, 1994. Kyiv, 1995.
_____. Naselennya Ukrayiny, 1992. Tekhnika, 1993.
_____. Natsionalnyy sklad naselennya Ukrayiny, chastyna I. Kyiv, 1991.
_____. Statystychnyy shchorichnyk Ukrayiny za 1995 rik.
Open Media Research Institute, Transition, no. 18, September 6, 1996.
Rapawy, Stephen. 1997. "Ethnic Reidentification in Ukraine," IPC Staff Paper No. 90, International Programs Center, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C.